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Criminal investigations involving presidents have become a political element of utmost importance 
for the stability of Latin American governments in the past few years. Between 2014 and 2015, cases of legal 
complaints against leaders of the Executive flamed up the political systems of Argentina (Nisman case), 
Bolivia (Fondo Indígena case), Brazil (Lava-Jato Operation), Chile (Caval case), El Salvador (lawsuit against 
Ernesto Funes), Guatemala (La Línea case), Honduras (Oposición Indignada movement), Mexico (Casa Blanca 
case), and Panama (lawsuit against Ricardo Martinelli). 
The Guatemalan case deserves special attention because it led up to an extreme result—the ouster of 
a sitting president—and because it concerned significant geopolitical calculations. It began with legal 
accusations brought up by an international organization named “International Commission against Impunity 
in Guatemala” (CICIG, Spanish abbreviation). CICIG was created in 2007 through a partnership between 
Guatemala and the United Nations (UN). Although it is formally bound to the UN, the organism is financed 
by voluntary contributions from any country or organization (CICIG, 2016b). The United States has donated 
to CICIG around US$ 36 million since 2008 (POCASANGRE, 2016). 
Designed to last until 2009, CICIG's mandate has been renewed every two years. Its official goal was 
to assist the police and the Public Ministry to investigate “illegal security groups” and “clandestine security 
organizations” (CICIG, 2016a; CICIG, 2016b). This wording is given to militias involved with organized crime 
and repression against those who condemn human rights violations by the Army during the civil war of 1960–
1996. Public servants suspected of being embroiled with these militias may be investigated. Complaints are 
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brought to the Guatemalan judiciary. CICIG also has the prerogative of proposing laws concerning organized 
crime, such as corruption and forced migration. 
In April 2015, CICIG brought to light an investigation involving president Otto Pérez Molina, a retired 
military officer and affiliated to the conservative Patriotic Party. The indictment, however, did not comprise 
any action of paramilitary groups or militias. Molina was accused of being the leader of a customs corruption 
ring, in which discounted tariffs were supposedly exchanged for bribes from importers. The case, known as La 
Línea, was one of a Chinese businessman involved in the scheme (LUHNOW, 2015). In the following months, 
mass demonstrations started to call for his resignation. In September, the Guatemalan Congress revoked his 
political rights, which led to his stepping down and pre-trial imprisonment. 
Molina had been in power since 2012. In the course of his mandate, he adopted positions contrary to 
those of the United States. For instance, he defended the legalization of drugs, recognized the Palestinian 
State, and did not want to renew CICIG’s mandate. In the presidential elections following his resignation, 
Jimmy Morales, a TV comedian and inexperienced politician, won based on an anti-corruption platform. His 
party, the National Convergence Front, is financially tied to a group of military officers that were active in the 
civil war (MOLINA, 2016). Morales has also taken stances closer to the US’s, such as the use of the Armed 
Forces to combat drugs and the continuity of CICIG. 
CICIG’s popular success for deposing a powerful politician starting from an accusation of corruption 
led to its quick reproduction in neighbouring countries. In February 2016, the “Mission to Support the Fight 
against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras” (MACCIH, Spanish abbreviation) was created. Instead of the 
UN, MACCIH is formally linked to the Organization of American States (OAS) (OAS, 2015). Honduras saw 
massive anti-corruption protests in 2015 which demanded the creation of a Honduran CICIG after the 
governing party was connected to a Social Security embezzlement scheme (MALKIN, 2015). The US 
Department of State promptly supported the initiative and declared that it hoped to see the creation of a 
similar body in El Salvador (RENWICK, 2016). 
Since 2014, the US has tried to deepen its ties with these three countries. That year around 70,000 
people, mainly children, left Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador to enter without documents in the US due 
to high levels of violence and economic crisis (WILTZ, 2015). Washington launched the Alliance for Prosperity 
in the Northern Triangle to suppress this immigration flow. This initiative is a billion dollars investment plan 
which officially aims to stimulate the economies of the three Central American states and strengthen their 
public institutions. 
The Alliance is part of the broader policy of the Obama administration for Central America, the “US 
Strategy for Engagement in Central America” (ALVARADO, 2016). Besides reducing corruption levels in 
public institutions, its objectives include the strengthening of free trade agreements, boosting the private 
sector, intensification of the cooperation between the military and police forces, containing migration flows, 
and increasing infrastructural links between Central and North America (USA, 2015). 
Achieving US goals becomes easier with organisms such as CICIG and MACCIH, which are maintained 
through international donors, since they may carry out criminal investigations of political actors and foreign 
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businessmen and -women, and also have the power to propose laws. A weaker Venezuela due to the steep fall 
of oil prices and Brazil's choice to focus on a South American integration project (instead of Latin American) 
offer little if none regional option to Central America to balance US interests. 
Outside the hemisphere, China has offered an alternative for political support. In Nicaragua, a 
Chinese company is building a bi-oceanic shipping route through the country. The Nicaragua Canal, as it is 
known, is going to be managed by this firm for 100 years (HKND..., 2013). In Jamaica another Chinese 
company unveiled in 2016 a highway connecting the North of the country to the South to be administered by 
China for 50 years (RUTTENBERG, 2016). China is also studying the construction of a deepwater port in the 
island nation (LAVILLE, 2015; RUTTENBERG, 2016). These projects challenge the traditional US hegemony 
in a security sensitive area and make Washington create new control mechanisms over Central American 
countries. 
Corruption allegations had already become an important political variable in recent episodes of 
government overthrows in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East during the so-called “Colour 
Revolutions” and “Arab Spring”. Such accusations have the capacity of receiving extensive media coverage, 
changing governmental and party approval ratings, reflecting on electoral campaigns, producing mass 
protests by the middle class, and creating mistrust of state activities. The novelty in Central America is the 
existence of international institutions than can produce these outcomes on a regular basis (IVES, 2016). 
The combat against corruption is an endless and arduous task wherever it takes place. However, it 
cannot be confused with the fight against one political force or another. Yet this seems to have been the case 
in Central America, where international anti-corruption organisms have spearheaded US efforts to maintain 
its hegemony in the region. This does not mean that the Western concerns over corruption abroad are entirely 
self-interested, but they ought to focus on measures to be taken domestically, such as regulating the 
international activities of their national companies, rather than prying other countries' leaders which do not 
please them. UN- and OAS-sponsored initiatives should be watchful of these ulterior interests for better 
respecting the sovereignty of the target states, such as Guatemala, Honduras and elsewhere. 
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RESUMO 
Esse texto analisa como os organismos de combate à corrupção na América Central garantem o domínio dos 
EUA sobre a região. Essas instituições parecem ter defendido interesses estadunidenses na Guatemala, em 
Honduras e em El Salvador em um contexto de crescente disputa com a China. Sugerimos que os países 
ocidentais se foquem em medidas domésticas para combater a corrupção no exterior e que órgãos 
internacionais respeitem a soberania dos países afetados. 
Palavras-Chave: América Central; Estado Unidos; Políticas anticorrupção  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This piece analyses how anti-corruption organisms in Central America advance US dominance in the region. 
These institutions seem to have spearheaded American interests in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador in 
a context of growing dispute with China. We suggest Western countries should focus on domestic measures 
to fight corruption abroad and international organisms should respect the sovereignty of target states. 
Keywords: Central America; United States; Anti-corruption policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
